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ADMINISTRATIVE LAw-AcT OF STATE-DEFENCE FOR AcTs WITHIN 
KING'S
DoMINioN.The plaintiff, a citizen of the United States, was arrested 
for drilling
revolutionary troops in Ireland. The defendant, the officer making the 
arrest,
seized and detained the plaintiff's money. His act was ratified by the Chief Secre-
tary for Ireland as an officer of the Crown. On being released from jail, 
the
plaintiff sued the officer for conversion. The defendant alleged that the 
plaintiff
was an alien and pleaded that the seizure yas an Act of State. Held, that 
the
defence of Act of State was invalid as to acts committed in the King's Dominions
on a bare averment that the plaintiff was an alien. Johnstone v. Pedlar (1921,
H. L.) 37 T. L. R. 870.
In England, an act injurious to the person or property of an alien, committed
abroad by a representative of the Crown, and either previously authorized or later
ratified by the Crown, becomes an Act of State and may not be reviewed by 
a
municipal court. See Moore, Act of State in English Law (19o6) 93; Borchard,
Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad (1915) 174; Bron v. Denman
(1848) 2 Exch. 167. The principal case has decided for the first 
time the appli-
cation of the doctrine to an alien within the United Kingdom. The result was
predicted by Moore, op. cit. 95. Aliens within the boundaries of a country are
now generally entitled to the same civil protection as citizens. Yick Wo v.
Hopkins (1886) 118 U. S. 366, 6 Sup. Ct. 1O64; cf. Halsey v. Lowenfeld [1916,
C. A.] 2 K. B. 707. Courts refrain, however, from passing on the political acts
of their own government. See COMMENTS (1918) 27 YALE LAWv JOURNAL, 813.
The Supreme Court of the United States refused to review the ratified expulsion
of a Chinese from the Philippines by the Governor General on the theory that
it was the exercise of a political privilege and became an Act of State. Tiaco v.
Forbes (1913) 228 U. S. 549, 33 Sup. Ct. 585. The expulsion of an alien, having
been within the power of the Philippine Congress, was as much a political act as
if it had been authorized by the Federal Congress. It did not require commission
abroad to be an Act of State, as it apparently does under the English doctrine.
Nor is the American theory limited in its application to aliens. The Wiggins Case
(1867) 3 Ct. Cl. 412, 423 (relieving officers of liability from suit 
by citizens) ;
Paquete Habana (19o2) 189 U. S. 453, 465, 23 Sup. Ct. 593, 594 (relieving
officers of liability for wrongful capture of foreign fishing smacks); see
O'Reilly v. Brooke (1908) 209 U. S. 45, 28 Sup. Ct. 439 (relieving military
governor of Cuba from suit); cf. Cook v. Sprigg [1899, P. C.] A. C. 572.
Moreover, it merges into the doctrine of non-suability of the State, peculiar to
Anglo-American law, when the State adopts as its own the act of the officer; both
State and officer being thus relieved of municipal legal liability. Any doctrine
relieving the public authorities from liabilities for injuries should be limited as
far as possible. For this reason the British Court's refusal in the instant case
to extend the Act of State doctrine is to be commended.
AGE NCY-UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL-RIGHT TO ENFORCE A CONTRACT 
UNDER
SEAL.-The plaintiff, an undisclosed principal, sought specific performance of a
contract under seal to make a lease. The lower court sustained the defendant's
demurrer. Held, that the demurrer should be overruled since there was a cause
of action. Lagumis v. Gerard (1921, N. Y. Sup. Ct) 65 N. Y. L. JoUR. 143 (Sept.
.20, 1921).
The prevailing common-law rule in this country is that the doctrine that an
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undisclosed principal may sue and be sued does not apply to contracts under seal.
Gill v. Atlanta, B. & A. Ry. (1920) 24 Ga. App. 78o, X02 S. E. 457; Briggs v.
Partridge (1876) 64 N. Y. 357. And this rule is rather illogically observed in
many states although the private seal has been abolished by statute. Donner v.
Whitecotton (igi) 2Ol Mo. App. 443, 212 S. W. 378. It is generally held in the
construction of such statutes that the mere formality of the seal is abolished
and that the law in regard to contracts under seal is unaffected. Donner v.
Whitecotton, supra; 'contra, Efta v. Swaison. (1911) 115 Minn. 373, 132 N. W.
335; see also (igig) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 229. Thus, merely because the word
"seal" or the letters "L. S." appear opposite the signatures of the parties to an
instrument, the principal may either escape the responsibilities of the contract or
be denied the advantages of it. Such a distinction is without foundation in view
of the fact that the seal has lost its ancient formality and has become what is
too often an unobserved part of printed forms of agreements. In point of jus-
tice the principal and the party with whom the agent has contracted should be
given relief as much upon contracts in this form as upon simple contracts. See
Ames, Undisclosed Principal-His Rights and Liabilities (igog) 18 YALE LAW
JouRNAL, 443. The decision in the principal case is progressive, if not revolu-
tionary, since it boldly casts aside the common-law rule without the aid of statute,
the private seal never having been abolished in New York. N. Y. Cons. Laws,
i9og, ch. 27, sec. 44. And it is still regarded as presumptive evidence of consid-
eration upon an executory contract. N. Y. C. C. P. ch. 9, sec. 84o. The court
has deliberately overthrown an ancient rule when every reason for it is gone and
every reason against it is present. See, Crane, The Magic of the Private Seal
(1915) 15 COL. L. REv. 24.
BILLS AND NOTES-DRAwEE BANK'S PRIVILEGE TO CHARGE BACK CHECKS
DRAWN BY ONE DEPOSITOR IN FAvOR OF ANOTHER.-The plaintiff depositor mailed
to the defendant bank a check in favor of himself drawn by another depositor,
requesting that it be credited to his account. The bank notified the plaintiff that it
had done so. It being discovered on the same day that the drawer's account was
insufficient the amount of the check was never debited against it. Two days later
the defendant wired the plaintiff that the check was worthless and thereupon
recharged the amount to the plaintiff's account. The plaintiff afterwards received
the bank's letter of acknowledgment and drew a check for the amount of the
credited sum. Payment being refused, he brought suit Held, that the plaintiff
could recover. Cohen v. First Nat. Bank of Nogales (1921, Ariz.) 198 Pac. 122.
The underlying principle upon which the instant case seems to rest is an excep-
tion to the general rule that money paid under a mistake of fact may be recovered.
Bank *v. Schwarzchild (19o9) 1O9 Va. 539, 64 S. E. 954; Liberty Trust Co. v.
Haggerty (1921, N. J. Eq.) J13 Atl. 596. That the drawer's signature was
forged, for instance, is no ground for recovery by a drawee bank that has paid
a check to a holder in good faith for value and without fault. Bank of Portland
v. U. S. Bank (1921, Or.) 197 Pac. 547; (1921) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 296.
Nor is the drawer's insolvency a ground for recovery. American Bank v
Miller (1911, C. A. A. 6th) 185 Fed. 338; Nat. Exch. Bank v. Ginn Co. (1916)
114 Md. 18l, 78 Atl. 1026. But to bring the instant case within this principle it
must be assumed, as the court did, that the credit given the plaintiff was equivalent
to an actual payment of the money and a redeposit Cohen v. Nat. Bank, supra
at p. 124. But whether or not paper so deposited is for payment or collection is
to be finally determined by the expressed or implied intention of the parties.
Williams v. Cox (1896) 97 Tenn. 555, 37 S. W. 282; Fayette Bank v. Summers
(19o6) io5 Va. 689, 54 S. E. 862; 7 L. R. A. (w. s.) 694, note. When the
indorsement of a check is in blank and credit is given and the crediting bank
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is not drawee, the general presumption is that the deposit was for payment and
title to the paper passes to the bank. Magee Banks and Banking (2d ed. 1913)
secs. 266, 267; Walker and Brock v. Ranlett (1915) 89 Vt. 71, 93 At. 1O54. A
fortiori such a presumption seems justified where the check is deposited with the
drawee bank. But see Nat. Gold Bank v. McDonald (875) 5I Calif. 64. The
instant case seems to prefer the technical rule of law to the equitable principle of
estoppel, which might have been applied had the court been so inclined, for the
plaintiff showed no loss through the bank's conduct and did nothing in reliance
upon the extension of credit See Walnut Hill Bank v. Nat. Reserve Bank
(1913) 141 App. Div. 475, 139 N. Y. Supp. 117.
CRIMINAL LAW-NECESSITY OF MENS REA IN STATUTORY OFFENCE.-The
defendant killed a domestic pigeon under an honest belief that it was a wild dove.
The Larceny Act, (1861) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, sec. 23, provided that, "Whosoever
shall unlawfully and wilfully kill any House Pigeon or Dove under such circum-
stances as shall not amount to Larceny at Common Law" shall be liable to a
penalty. Held, that an honest mistake of fact was no defence to a charge under
that section. Horton v. Gwynne [1921] 2 K. B. 66I.
It is elementary that nens rea is essential to common-law offences. 1 Bishop,
New Criminal Law (8th ed. 1892) sec. 3O. But the legislature may make
certain acts criminal irrespective of guilty knowledge. Commonwealth v. Weiss
(891) 139 Pa. 247, 21 Atl. io. In the absence of specific language, the
necessity of -nens rea is a problem of construction, in the solution of which the
purpose and design of the statute must be kept in view. Troutner v. State (1916)
17 Ariz. 5o6, 154 Pac. 1O48. Guilty knowledge is essential to crimes inalhm in se.
I Bishop, op. cit. sec. 3o3, note 2. But intent is usually immaterial in offenses
inalunm prohibitum. Mens rea was immaterial in a conviction for selling liquor
to a minor in violation of a statute. State v. Brownt (1914) 73 Or. 325, 144
Pac. 444. And for furnishing oleomargarine without notifying patrons. State v.
WelcL (1911) 145 Wis. 86, 129 N. W. 656. Ignorance of fact was no defence
to a charge of selling an intoxicant as a "soft drink." Commonwealth v. Weiss
(891) 139 Pa. 247, 21 Atl. Io. The instant case seems to have carried the inalim
prohibitum doctrine to the extreme. The preamble to the Larceny Act begins,
...... to consolidate and amend the statute law relating to Larceny and other simi-
lar offenses." The section in question is preceded by sections dealing with the stealing
of horses, cows, sheep, and other animals. "Wilfully" in a criminal statute gener-
ally means with a bad purpose. State v. Clifton (191o) 152 N. C. 8oo, 67 S. E.
751. "Unlawfully" is sufficient to charge a wrongful intent. EX parte Ahart
(1916) 172 Calif. 762, 765, 159 Pac. i6o, 162; Newby v. State (1905) 75 Neb.
33, 36, 1O5 N. W. Io99, ioo. It is believed, therefore, that mnens rea should have
been an essential element for conviction in the instant case. Such a result was
reached in an indictment under the same section. Taylor v. Newman (1863,
Q. B.) 4 B. & S. 89. The court, however, tried to distinguish that case.
EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT-LAcK OF KNOWLEDGE OF DESTINATION IMMATERIAL
IN DETERMINING INTERSTATE STATUS OF SHIPMENT.-The plaintiff's intestate, a
conductdr of a switching crew, employed by the defendant on its terminal track at
Buffalo, was killed by reason of the derailment of his engine while transferring
three carloads of beef from a local storage house to the New York Central tracks
in East Buffalo. The beef was in fact destined for Montreal and thence to
England, but the waybill merely called for switching between lines, and the defen-
dant had not been notified in advance of the foreign character of the shipment.
The lower court ruled that the plaintiff's intestate was engaged in foreign
commerce when killed. Held, (three judges dissenting) that the plaintiff could
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recover under the Federal Employers' Liability Act Cott v. Erie Ry. (I92I)
231 N. Y. 67, I31 N. E. 737.
The test adopted by the United States Supreme Court in determining whether an
employee is engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, is whether he was engaged at the time of the injury
in interstate transportation or in work so closely related to it as to be practically
a part of it. Shanks v. Delaware, L. & W. Ry. (1916) 239 U. S. 556, 36 Sup. Ct.
188. The multitude of apparently conflicting decisions on the subject, however,
seems to indicate that if any definite criterion exists it is difficult to apply. In the
last analysis, the particular facts of each case are decisive, and the tendency of the
courts is to give to the term "interstate commerce" a broad significance. Hopkins
v. United States (1898) 171 U. S. 578, 19 Sup. Ct 40. The test is the nature
of the work being done at the time of the injury. Erie Ry. v. Welsh (1916)
242 U. S. 303, 319 Sup. Ct 116. If such work is a necessary preparatory move-
ment in aid of interstate transportation, the national statute applies to employees
so engaged. Southern Ry. v. Puckett (1917) 244 U. S. 571, 37 Sup. Ct 703.
The burden of proving that the injured employee was engaged in interstate or
foreign commerce at the time of the injury is on the plaintiff. Hench v. Pennsyl-
vania Ry. (1914) 246 Pa. I, 91 Atl. 1o56; L. R. A. 1915 C, 64, note; I Roberts,
Federal Liabilities of Carriers (1918) sec. 465. But when the action is brought
under a state workmen's compensation statute or at common law, and the defence
is that the Federal Act applies, the defendant has the burden of proving that the
employee was employed in interstate commerce when he was injured. Zavitovsky
v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. (1915) 161 Wis. 461, 154 N. W. 974. The view of
the majority in the principal case appears to be sound. The interstate or foreign
status of a shipment cannot be determined by the mere forms of billing or contract,
but by the essential character of the commerce, that is, whether there is a contin-
uity of movement from a point in one state to a point in another. Texas & N. 0.
Ry. v. Sabine Tram Co. (1913) 227 U. S. III, 33 Sup. Ct 229; Ruppell v. New
York Cent. Ry. (1916) 171 App. Div. 832, 157 N. Y. Supp. lo95; Rich v. St.
Louis & S. F. Ry. (1912) 166 Mo. App. 379, 148 S. W. ioll; L. R. A. 1915C,
6o, note. If the cars are in fact moving in interstate or foreign commerce,
knowledge on the part of the employer concerning their ultimate destination would
seem to be immaterial. [The Supreme Court of the United States has refused
to review the decision in the instant case. See daily press, October ii, 1921.]
EVIDENc-ADISsulLITY-HAITUAL USE OF DRUGS.-To discredit a witness
for the defence, the prosecution questioned her in regard to her habitual use of
morphine. She denied its use. The prosecution then introduced evidence which
tended to prove that the witness was a confirmed drug addict, and also that the
drug had a harmful effect upon her powers of observation. It was not shown
that the witness was under the influence of the drug at the time of the event
concerning which she testified nor at the time of giving her testimony. Held, that
such evidence was admissible. State v. Prentice (1921, Iowa) 183 N. W. 411.
Evidence tending to prove that a witness was under the influence of a drug
either at the time of the event concerning which he testifies or at the time of giving
his testimony is everywhere admitted for the purpose of affecting the credibility of
the witness. People v. Webster (1893) 139 N. Y. 73, 34 N. E. 730; Wilson v.
United States (1913) 232 U. S. 563, 34 Sup. Ct. 347. The mere fact that a
witness is a habitual user of drugs is not of itself admissible to discredit the
witness. Williams v. United States (1904) 6 Ind. Ter. 1, 88 S. W. 334; Botkin
v. Cassady (1898) io6 Iowa, 334, 76 N. W. 722; Gordon v. Gilmer (1914)
141 Ga. 347, 8o S. E. lOO7. But if it is accompanied by evidence that the use of
drugs has materially impaired the testimonial qualifications of the witness, then
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such evidence is received. Anderson v. State (1912) 65 Tex. Cr. App. 365, 144
S. W. 281; State v. Fong Loon (1916) 29 Idaho, 248, 158 Pac. 233; but see
State v. King (1903) 88 Minn. 175, 92 N. W. 965. The opinions seem to indicate
that only direct evidence is admissible to show that a witness's mind'has been
impaired by the use of drugs. Eldridge v. State (i89i) 27 Fla. 162, 9 So. 448;
Gordon v. Gilmer, supra. However, the court in the principal case is not without
authority to admit circumstantial evidence for this purpose. State v. Robinson
(1895) 12 Wash. 491, 41 Pac. 884; Anderson v. State, supra. The inquiry in
regard to a witness's use of drugs has been restricted by some courts entirely to the
cross examination of the witness. State v. Schuman (1915) 89 Wash. 9, 153 Pac.
1084. The better view, however, is to admit extrinsic evidence which tends to
discredit the witness's testimonial powers, and the court in the principal case seems
to be correct in so doing. People v. Webster, supra; 2 Wigmore, Evidence
(1904) sec. 1005.
JURISDICTION-EMINENT DOMAIN-POWER OF ONE STATE TO CONDEMN PROPERTY
IN ANoTHER.-Pursuant to a Wisconsin statute (Wis. Sts. 1911, ch. 87, sec.
1797, m. 79) the city of Superior in that state began eminent domain proceedings
to acquire the plaintiff's waterworks system, a part of which was in the state of
Minnesota. The plaintiff filed a bill to enjoin these proceedings and the city
demurred. Held, that the demurrer should be sustained. Rosenberry, J.,
dissenting. Superior Water, Lt. & Power Co. v. City of Superior (1921, Wis.)
183 N. W. 254.
The power of eminent domain can be exercised only as prescribed by statute.
See I Lewis, Eminent Domain (3d ed. I9O9) secs. 367-368; I Nichols, Eminent
Domain (2d ed. 1917) sec. ig. Statutes generally have no extra-territorial
effect. See Sutherland, Statutory Construction (i89i) sec. 12; 1 Lewis, op. cit.
sec. 385. (This is true, however, only as a matter of positive law. See Lorenzen,
The Theory of Qualifications and the Conflict of Laws (192o) 20 COL. L. REv.
276-280.) The court seeks to avoid the fact by calling the entire plant personalty
and hence Wisconsin property,-even as to "any real estate or interest therein that
the company may own" across the state line. See Superior Co. v. Superior, supra
at p. 257. Even if this fiction were true, it does not settle the question of juris-
diction; for, in eminent domain proceedings, the decree operates to pass title and,
the statute having no extra-territorial effect, obviously a decree rendered thereunder
can have none. See 2 Nichols, op. cit. secs. 369, 370, 374; see State v. Superior
Court (1914) 8o Wash. 417, 422, 141 Pac. 9o6, 9o8; COMMENTS (1919) 28
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 588, 589. Nor would such a decree be binding on the courts
at the situs. See Evansville Traction Co. v. Henderson Bridge Co. (1904, C. C.
W. D. Ky.) 134 Fed. 973, 975: But to obviate this the court declares that "equity
has ample power to compel a conveyance on the part of the water company."
But it has been held that equity will not exercise its power to enforce the power of
eminent domain. West. Union Tel. Co. v. N. C. & St. L. Ry. (1917, N. D. Ga.)
243 Fed. 694; Mobile Ry. v. Hoye (I9O6) 87 Miss. 571, 40 So. 5. The court
tries to avoid this by considering the franchise as a contract. But it is then far
from its original position that there was jurisdiction to divest the water company
of title "pursuant to its power of eminent domain." Even this construction is
arguable. See the instant court's discussion in Superior Power Co. v. Superior
(1921, Wis.) 181 N. W. 113, 123; State v. Circuit Court (1915) 162 Wis. 234,
236, 155 N. W. 139, 140; as to when equity will take jurisdiction over foreign
property see COMMENTS (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 946. The result of the
decision in the instant case is desirable; the reasoning is difficult to justify. On
almost identical facts the opposite result has been reached. See Crosby v. Hanover
(1858) 36 N. H. 404, 422. Some states have remedied the situation by reciprocal
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statutes. See Wash. Laws, i9og, ch. 6; Or. Laws, 1920, sec. 3772; (1921) 19
MicH. L. REv. 448.
MASTER AND SERVANT-INDEPENDENT CONTRACToR-DELEGATION OF DUTY OWED
TO INVITE.-The deceased, an employee of an independent contractor, while
installing elevator doors in the defendant's mercantile building, was killed through
the carelessness of the elevator attendant, an employee of another independent
contractor, who operated the elevator for the defendant Held, (three judges
dissenting) that the defendant was liable. Besner v. Central Trust Co. (1921)
230 N. Y. 357, 13o N. E. 577.
It is well settled that it is the duty of the owner of land to exercise reasonable
care to keep the premises in a safe condition for the use of those present by express
or implied invitation. 3 Shearman and Redfield, Negligence (6th ed. 1913) 1853.
A person is an invitee when he is present for the benefit, or in the interest of, the
owner or occupant, or when his presence is of mutual interest. Meiers v. Fred
Koch Brewery (1920) 229 N. Y. IO, 127 N. E. 491; Coburn v. Village of
Swanton (192o, Vt.) lO9 Atl. 854. An employee of a contractor engaged to do
work on the premises is regarded as an invitee. I Thompson, Negligence (igol)
898; John Spry Lumber Co. v. Duggan (I898) 8o Ill. App. 394. As a general
rule, an employer is not liable for the negligence of his independent contractor or
the latter's servants. 14 R. C. L. 79. But if one is on the premises as an invitee,
the duty of keeping the premises reasonably safe for use according to the invitation,
cannot be delegated to an independent contractor. Curtis v. Kiley (89I) 153
Mass. 123, 26 N. E. 42z. Upon this principle the decision in the instant case seems
sound since the deceased may well have understood that the owner of the building
was holding himself out as having control of the elevator and that he could
be relied upon to use due care in its operation. And since at the time of the acci-
dent the deceased was engaged in the performance of the very purpose for which
he was invited and in accordance with the terms of the invitation as he understood
them, the owner ought not to be allowed to delegate the duty to use reasonable care
for his safety to an independent contractor. A more difficult situation would
present itself if the deceased were aware of the fact that the elevator were under
the control of the independent contractor. It is problematical whether the owner
would be liable under such circumstances.
MASTER AND SERVANT-RESPONSIBILITY FOR SERVANT'S DEVIATION OR DEPAR-
TURE.-The defendant's chauffeur was ordered to go from the defendant's mill
to some freight yards and to bring back some barrels of paint. After loading,
he drove four blocks beyond the yard to his sister's house to give her some waste
wood found at the yard. On the way back to the defendant's mill, and before he
had passed the yard again, he negligently injured the plaintiff. Held, (three
judges dissenting) that, even if the trip to his sister's house were a departure and
not a mere deviation, he had reached a point, on the return toward the mill, which
brought him again within the scope of his employment, so as to render the master
liable. Riley v. Standard Oil Co. (i92I) 231 N. Y. 301, 132 N. E. 97.
The wide conflict in this class of cases is not due to any uncertainty in the law,
but to constantly varying interpretations of the facts. For example. it is well
settled that, when a chauffeur is "on a frolic of his own," i. e., without permission
and for no purpose connected with his master's service, he takes out the car, the
trip is a complete departure, and the master is not liable for any accidents
occurring. Storey v. Ashton (1869) L. R. 4 Q. B. 476; Donnelly v. Yuille
(1921) 197 App. Div. 59, 188 N. Y. Supp. 603; Colwell v. Aetna Bottle Co.
(1912) 33 R- 1. 531, 82 Atl. 388; contra, Quinn v. Power (1882) 87 N. Y. 535.
It is as well settled that, when the servant is simultaneously doing his master's
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and his own business, he is within the scope of his employment, and the master is
liable. Patten v. Rea (1857) 2 C. B. (N. s.) 605; Clawson v. Pierce-Arrow
Motor Car Co. (1921) 231 N. Y. 273, 131 N. E. 914; contra, Schoenherr v.
Hartfield (1916) 172 App. Div. 294, I58 N. Y. Supp. 388; (1920) 30 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, i89. But where a servant starts out to do his master's business,
and somewhere on the way deviates for his own purposes, some courts have held
this as a departure absolving the master. Mitchell v. Crassweller (1853) I3 C. B.
237; McCarthy v. Timnins (igol) 178 Mass. 378, 59 N. E. IO38. Others have
called it a mere deviation, equivalent to doing the master's work irregularly or
badly. Whimster v. Holnes (914) 177 Mo. App. 130, 164 S. W. 236. The
dividing line between a departure and a deviation is, of course, a difficult "question
of degree." Storey v. Ashton, supra. The tendency is however, to consider even
a departure only a deviation, if on the way back,-that is, as soon as the servant's
own errand is at an end, and he begins to return-he is again performing his
service.' Barmore v. Vicksburg (904) 85 Miss. 426, 38 So. 21o. This is as
extreme a view as that which regards the entire trip as outside the scope of his
employment. Patterson v. Kates (i9o7, C. C. E. D. Pa.) 152 Fed. 481; 2
Mechem, Agency (2d ed. 1914) par. i9o7. The better view-a compromise
between these two extremes-is that when the servant returns to that point, where,
if he had not continued for a personal purpose, it would be considered a deviation
and not a departure, the master's responsibility reattaches. Dockweiler v. Amer.
Piano Co. (1916, Sup. Ct.) 94 Misc. 712, 16o N. Y. Supp. 270. The principal
case seems to reflect this better tendency.
PROPERTY-COVENANT AGAINST INCUMBRANcEs-EFFEcT OF EASEMENT GRANTED
BY ImPERFEcT DEED.-The defendant conveyed land to the plaintiff with a covenant
against incumbrances. A third person held a deed of an easement on the land and
had made improvements while in possession. But the deed was unattested and
unacknowledged and a statute rendered it invalid against the subsequent purchaser
of the land. The plaintiff, having notice of the facts, sued for a breach of the
covenant Held, (three judges dissenting) that the plaintiff could recover. City
of New York v. New York and South Brooklyn Perry & Steam Transp. Co.
(I921) 231 N. Y. 18, 131 N. E. 554.
An incumbrance in a covenant against incumbrances is a burden on land
depreciative of its value. 16 A. & E. Enc. Law, 158. A specifically enforceable
contract against the grantor of which the grantee has notice is such. Cmminns v.
Beavers (I9O4) 103 Va. 230, 48 S. E. 891; Willoughby v. Lawrence (1886)
116 Ill. 11, 4 N. E. 356; Clark, Equity (1919) sec. 86. The fact that the latter
had knowledge of the incumbrance before accepting the deed does not release the
former from his covenant. Huyck v. Andrews (1889) 113 N. Y. 8I, 2o N. E. 581.
Being a freehold estate, an easement can be granted only by deed. Cayuga Ry. v.
Niles (1878, N. Y.) 13 Hun, i7o. In equity, however, partial performance of
an oral contract gives the claimant of the easement an equitable interest in the
land. Wiseman v. Lucksinger (x881) 84 N. Y. 31. By statute, a subsequent
purchaser is not bound by an unattested and unacknowledged grant of a freehold.
N. Y. Cons. Laws, 19o9, ch. 50, sec. 243. Even if such purchaser acts in bad
faith and with notice. Chamberlain v. Spargur (1881) 86 N. Y. 603; Dunn v.
Dunn (1912) 151 App. Div. 8oo, 136 N. Y. Supp. 282. But the grant is effective
between the original parties. Strough v. Wilder (i8go) 119 N. Y. 530. In the
instant case the court held that, though the deed was invalid as a conveyance by the
statute, partial performance in reliance on it bound the subsequent purchaser with
notice and therefore that the covenant against incumbrances had been broken.
The case depends entirely upon interpretation. If the subsequent purchaser is
protected absolutely against all persons holding grants which lack the formal
IO0
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requisites of the statute, the dissenting opinion is justified. The majority view,
however, seems preferable. Strict interpretation would contradict the established
principles of equity, which are recognized as paramount in another section of the
same statute. N. Y. Cons. Laws, 19o9, ch. 50, sec. 250.
TORTS-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-CARE REQUIRED OF GUEsT IN AuTomo-
BrE.-The plaintiff, a guest in an automobile driven by the owner, was injured
in a collision with a street car. Familiar with the surroundings, and with adequate
opportunity to make observations, the plaintiff took no measures to discover the
danger or warn the driver. A proximate cause of the collision was the driver's
negligence. The plaintiff sought damages from the street railway company. Held,
that the plaintiff's conduct constituted contributory negligence and that therefore
he could not recover. Hill v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co. (1921, Pa.) 114
AtI. 634.
The duty of a driver to his guest is not to increase the dangers ordinarily inci-
dent to driving. Perkins v. Galloway (1916) 198 Ala. 658, 73 So. 956. The
courts differ as to the degree of care to be exercised by the guest, the cases being
sometimes divided into two groups. NbTES (1918) 3 CORN. L. QUART. I56. The
first charges the guest with the absolute duty of keeping a lookout for his own
safety, not permitting him to trust to the care of the driver. Koehler v. Rochester
& L. Ont. Ry. (1893, N. Y.) 66 Hun, 566. This category, apparently that of the
principal case, is perhaps extreme. The second allows the guest to rely upon a
driver whom he believes to be careful. Howe v. Minneapolis, St. P. &" S. Ste. M.
Ry. (1895) 62 Minn. 71, 64 N. W. 102. Where the guest has no control over
the driver, the negligence of the latter is not imputed to him. Chodes v. Clark
Seed Co. (1920) 95 Conn. 263, 11I Atl. 58. But the guest is bound to exercise
such care for his safety as the exigencies of the situation require. Praught v.
Great Northern Ry. (1920) 144 Minn. 309, 175 N. W. 998. He must observe
the care of an ordinary person in like circumstances in respect to dangers known
to him or reasonably foreseeable by him; but he is under no duty to anticipate
that the driver, if reasonably believed to be competent, will fail to exercise proper
care. Birmingham Ry. v. Barranco (1920) 203 Ala. 639, 84 So. 839. A guest is
not charged with the same strict duty of keeping a lookout as'the driver; he may
rely in some measure on the assumption that the driver will use care to avoid the
dangers of the road. Christensen v. Johnston (1917) 207 Ill. App. 209; Martin
v. Southern Pac. Co. (1919, Calif. App.) 185 Pac. lO3O. The guest is not guilty
of contributory negligence as a matter of law merely because he has done nothing;
for in many cases, the highest degree of caution consists of inaction. Hermann v.
Rhode Island Co. (1914) 36 R. I. 447, 90 Atl. 813. Failure to keep a lookout
and warn may be evidence of negligence, but not conclusive evidence. Carnegie v.
Great Northern Ry. (1914) 128 Minn. 14, 15o N. W. 164. "A guest is not
expected to direct the driver nor keep a lookout; he may go to sleep, read, talk,
or remain in deep thought, without being chargeable with negligence; but he
would be negligent should be unreasonably fail to give warning of known danger."
Weidlich v. N. Y., N. H. & H. Ry. (1919) 93 Conn. 438, io6 AtI. 323. He is not
responsible for the failure to discover dangers which he might have discovered
had he given attention to the roadway ahead. Azinger v. Pennsylvania Ry.
(i918) 262 Pa. 242, i05 Atl. 87. The extent to which a guest should foresee an
impending peril and act in relation thereto, depends upon the facts peculiar to
each case, and it is a question of fact for the jury. Christison v. St. Paul City Ry.
(1917) 138 Minn. 456, 165 N. W. 273. Unlike that of the principal case, the
better rule, it seems, would impose no duty on the guest to keep a lookout and
warn the driver, unless a manifest danger has come to his knowledge, which he has
reason to believe is unknown to the driver. Weidlich v. N. Y., N. H. & H. Ry.
sup ra.
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TORTS-INFANT TRESPASSER UPON AERIAL RIGHT OF WAY-UNINSULATED ELEC-
TRic WxEs.-The thirteen year old plaintiff climbed a tree through which ran the
uninsulated wires of the defendant company. The tree was standing near the
highway, but was not on the defendant's land. He grasped a wire, and received
the injury for which suit was brought Held, that the plaintiff could not recover.
Peaslee, J., dissenting. McCaffrey v. Concord Electric Co. (1921, N. H.) 114
Atl. 395.
The courts are in conflict as to whether a small boy climbing in a tree, through
which an electric company has a right of way for its wires, is a trespasser against
the electric company. Some courts hold that he is a trespasser against the owner
of the tree, but not against the electric company. Williams v. Springfield Gas &
Electric Co. (1918) 274 Mo. I, 2o2 S. W. I; Benton v. North Carolina Public
Service Co. (1914) 165 N. C. 354, 81 S. E. 448; Curtis, The Law of Electricity
(915) sec. 512; contra, Robbins v. Minute Tapioca Co. (192o, Mass.) 128 N. E.
417. Another line of cases holds that when a company places an unattractive,
though dangerous, instrumentality, in a place attractive to children, it is liable for
any injuries suffered by a trespassing infant due to its uninsulatedwires. Consoli-
dated Electric Co. v. Healy (19o2) 65 Kan. 798, 70 Pac. 884. It is negligent to
leave uninsulated a highly-charged electric wire which passes through a tree near
the roadside, for the company must anticipate that infants will climb in such a tree.
Temple v. McComb City Electric Co. (1907) 89 Miss. x, 42 So. 874; Sweeten v.
Pacific Power & Light Co. (915) 88 Wash. 679, 153 Pac. 1054; (1920) 18 MICH. L.
REv. 426. Where a dangerous electric wire, impracticable of complete insulation,
was placed in close proximity to the trellis-like support of another company, so
that an infant, being attracted to climb the trellis, was injured by contact with the
wire, the court held that the party responsible for creating the dangerous agency
was liable. Stedwell v. City of Chicago (1921, Ill.) 13o N. E. 729; I Thompson,
Negligence (190l) sec. 1O3O. Some courts have in terms adopted the "Turntable
Doctrine" in cases similar to the principal one. New York, New Haven, & Hart-
ford Ry. v. Fruchter (1921, C. C. A. 2d) 271 Fed. 419; criticized in (I921) 3o
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 87o; see (1915) 25 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 84; COMMENTS
(1919) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 223; Jeremiah Smith, Liability of Landowners to
Children Entering without Permission (1898) I HAav. L. REv. 349, 434. The
orthodox view, to which that of the principal case is analogous, is that a landowner
has a right to the exclusive possession of his property, and that anyone trespassing,
whether infant or adult, does so at his own risk except where the injury is caused
by a wilful or wanton act. Ryan v. Towar (19Ol) 128 Mich. 463, 87 N. W. 644;
Gherra v. Central Illinois Public Service Co. (1918) 212 Ill. App. 48 (company
not liable for injury received due to an uninsulated wire by a trespassing infant
climbing a tree near the highway). The present decision follows its state prece-
dents, but it seems as though it would have been better if the court had regarded
the defendant as owing a duty to the infant and not looking upon the tresplass on
the aerial right of way in such a highly technical sense, had allowed a recovery, as
was done in a recent well-considered case which involved a similar technicality.
Hynes v. New York Central Ry. (1921) 231 N. Y. 229, 131 N. E. 898.
TORTS-PROXIMATE CAUSE-INJURY CAUSING DISEASE RESULTING IN DEATH.-
Due to the defendant's negligence, the decedent, a subway passenger, suffered an
injury resulting in the bruising of her body. Some three weeks later she died of
pneumonia. In an action brought by her administrator for negligently causing the
death of the deceased, the jury found for the plaintiff. Held, reversing the judg-
ment of the lower court, that the plaintiff had failed to show an unbroken connec-
tion between the wrongful act and the death. Greenbaum, J., dissenting. Santolo
v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co. (1921) 196 App. Div. 34, 187 N. Y. Supp. 39o.
:102
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A defendant is usually liable for any injury proximately due to his negligence,
although the particular injury could not have been anticipated as probable. See
Childs v. Standard Oil Co. (1921, Minn.) 182 N. W. iooi; Polewris v. Furness,
Withy, & Co. Ltd. (1921, C. A.) 37 L. T. R. 940. Causal connection is not
generally broken by the following facts: (I) instinctive acts of the plaintiff or
third persons, if reasonable; Woolley v. Scovell (1828, K. B.) 3 Man. & R. io5;
Scott v. Shepherd (1773, C. P.) 3 Wils. 407; (2) acts due to deliberate choice of
plaintiff or third persons, if reasonable; Boggs v. Jewell Tea Co. (1919) 263 Pa.
413, lO9 Atl. 666; Vandenburg v. Truax (1847, N. Y.) 4 Denio, 464; (3) inno-
cent, or indeed wrongful, acts of third persons, if foreseeable and reasonable;
Brower v. N. Y. C. & H. R. Ry. (1918) 91 N. J. L. 19o, 1o3 Atl. 166; contra,
Andrews & Co. v. Kinsel (igoi) 114 Ga. 390, 40 S. E. 300. See (1918) 27
YALE LAW JOURNAL, i087; (4) fright caused by negligence resulting in injury,
such as a miscarriage; Ala. Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladini (1916) 15 Ala. App. 316,
73 So. 205; contra, Nelson v. Crawford (1899) 122 Mich. 466, 81 N. W. 335;
(5) disease, even though there was a pre-existing tendency toward it McCahill v.
N. Y. Transportation Co. (I911) 2o1 N. Y. 221, 94 N. E. 616. Where, however,
the injury caused insanity, and, while insane, the injured person committed suicide,
death is held not to be a proximate result of the injury. Daniels v. N. Y., N. H. &
H. Ry. (19o3) 183 Mass. 393, 67 N. E. 424. There seems to be no sound reason
for this holding. Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act (1920) 33
HARV. L. REv. 633, 645. A greater degree of liberality is shown in workmen's
compensation cases than in those at common law when death resulted from a
disease following an injury. State, ex rel. Jefferson, v. District Court (1917)
138 Minn. 334, 164 N. W. 12; Harper, Workmen's Compensation (2d ed. 1920)
130. On facts similar to the principal case the finding of a workmen's compen-
sation commission in favor of a plaintiff has been sustained. Driscoll v. Jewell
Belting Co. (192i, Conn.) 114 Atl. io9. The distinction is without foundation.
If disease brought on by injury causes death, the injury is the proximate cause of
death, and the disease is not an independent cause. I Thompson, Negligence
(9oi) 15o. Disease after an injury is as probable and foreseeable as any of the
intermediate causes previously enumerated. No inflexible, definite principle of
causation can be laid down. I Street, Legal Liability (19o6) 11o; Parker v.
Marlboro Cotton Mills (192o) 114 S. C. 156, 1O3 S. E. 512. Whether a particular
disease is the result of a particular injury is a -question of fact for the jury.
Baltimore City Passenger Ry. v. Kemp (1883) 61 Md. 74; I Thompson, op. cit.
154. It seems as if the court might well have upheld the verdict in the instant
case.
ToRTS-REcovERY By ADMINISTRATOR ON BEHALF OF BENEFICIARY WHOSE NEGLi-
GENCE CONTRIBUTED TO INJURY CAUSING DEATH OF INTESTATE.-The administrator
of a child killed by the defendant's negligence brought action under the Ohio death
statute to recover damages on behalf of the child's parents. The trial court
instructed the jury to disregard the contributory negligence of the parents in
determining the right of recovery. Held, that the question of contributory negli-
gence should have been submitted to the jury. Star Fire Clay Co. v. Budno
(192o, C. C. A. 6th) 269 Fed. 508.
The Ohio statute (Gen. Code Ohio, 1910, tit. 3, ch. 3, secs. 1o77o, 1o772) under
which this action was brought is substantially similar to Lord Campbell's Act.
In cases brought under statutes of this type many courts deny recovery to a negli-
gent beneficiary, because it would be unreasonable to permit one who had negli-
gently sacrificed another's life to profit by that negligence. Lee v. New River
Coal Co. (1913, C. C. A. 4th) 203 Fed. 644, under W. Va. Code, 19o6, ch. 1O3,
secs. 3488, 3489; Kentucky Utilities Co. v. McCarty's Adm'r. (1916) i69 Ky.
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38, 183 S. W. 237, under Const. i8gr, sec. 241 and Sts. 1915, sec. 6; Kuchier v.
Milwaukee etc. Co. (1914) 157 Wis. 107, 146 N. W. 1133, under Sts. 1898, ch. 178,
secs. 4255, 4256 as amended by Laws, 1911, ch. 226. Other jurisdictions, contrary
to the holding of the instant case, allow a recovery under statutes of the Lord
Campbell type on the ground that the legislature has specifically declared that a
right of action shall exist in the personal representative, and that it is not within
the province of the court to consider the negligence of the beneficiaries. Hines v.
McCullers (1920) 121 Miss. 666, 83 So. 734 under Hem. Ann. Code, 1917, ch. 9,
sec. 5O1; Braun, Adin'r. v. Buffalo Gen'l. Elec. Co. (1914) 213 N. Y. 655, 107
N. E. 338, under C. C. P. 189o, ch. 15, sec. 1902. The statutes which are modeled
on Lord Campbell's Act provide for a right of action in the personal representa-
tive, if the deceased, had he lived, would have had a cause of action. The so-called
"survival" statutes simply provide that the deceased's cause of action shall survive
to the personal representative. Under statutes of the latter type, a recovery is
generally allowed on behalf of negligent beneficiaries, the courts viewing such
recovery as a mere incident to the action in favor of the estate. Wymore v.
Mahaska County (1889) 78 Iowa, 396, 43 N. W. 264, see Code, 1897, tit. I8, ch. i,
sees. 3443, 3445. Warren, Adm'r, v. Manchester Ry. (9oo) 7o N. H. 352, 47 Atl.
735, under Pub. Sts. i891, ch. 191, secs. 8, 13. But see contra, Crevilli v. Chicago
Ry. (917) 98 Wash. 42, 167 Pac. 66, under Act of April 5, 1910 (36 Stat. at
L. 291) ; see criticism (9U7) 27 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 413. It has been held that
recovery can be had under such a "survival" statute, whereas had the action been
brought under the death statute in the same state-Kirby's Ark. Dig. 19o4, ch.
125, secs. 6289, 6290-substantially following Lord Campbell's Act; no recovery
could be had. Nashville Lumber Co. v. Busbee (1911) ioo Ark. 76, 139 S. W.
301, 38 L. R A. (N. s.) 754, note, under Kirby Dig. 1904, ch. 125, sec. 6285 and
ch. 51, sec. 2636 (2) ; compare likewise Love v. Detroit Ry. (I912) i7o Mich.
i, 135 N. W. 963 with Feldman v. Detroit United Ry. (igio) 162 Mich. 486, 127
N. W. 687. If it is conceded to be a fundamental principle of law that one guilty
of contributory negligence proximately contributing to an injury should not be
allowed any recompense for the loss occasioned through his own negligence, the
view of those courts denying recovery is sound. If, on the other hand, it be
thought more just and politic in the average case to allow recovery in spite of
such negligence, on the ground that actual damages are thereby more evenly
distributed-the loss of the person, compensated as well as may be by damages,
being borne by the family, the loss of money by the defendant-the statutes,
whether of the Lord Campbell or of the survival type, unquestionably permit-by
literal interpretation-such a recovery,--a result in fact reached by the courts of
many jurisdictions, among them New Hampshire and New York.
WLs-CoNsTRucTIoN OF REPUGNANT CLAusEs-GIFT ovER AFTER GENERAL
BEQUEST.-The testator provided: "To my sister Georgie I give and bequeath
four thousand dollars. At her decease same to go to my sister Frances." Held,
(three judges dissenting) that Georgie took a life estate only. Gregg v. Bailey
(1921, Me.) 113 AtI. 397.
The majority opinion rested on the testator's intention as disclosed by the two
gifts considered together, while it was argued in the dissenting opinion that the
bequest to Georgie, being without words of limitation, passed an absolute estate,
rendering any limitation over repuguant and void. A Maine statute declares that
"a devise of land conveys all the estate of the devisor therein unless it appears by
the will that he intended to convey a less estate." Rev. Sts. 19o3, ch. 76, sec. 16.
By analogy, the same rule is applied to bequests of personalty. Loring v. Hayes
(1894) 86 Me. 351, 29 Atl. lO93. The statute seems to require a reading of the
will as a whole in the determination of the testator's intent. If two plainly repug-
RECENT CASE NOTES
nant intentions are then discovered, one must give way to the other. Ramsdell v.
Ramsdell (1842) 21 Me. 288, 293; Jackson v. Robins (18ig, N. Y.) 16 Johns.
537, 589. This difficulty does not arise in the instant case unless it is necessary to
consider the clause providing for the gift to Georgie as absolute, separate, and
apart from the provision making the gift to Frances. A gift to one and his heirs
is clearly absolute. Morrill v. Morrill (1917) 116 Me. 154, ioo At. 756. A gift
simpliciter coupled with an absolute power of disposition, express, or implied by a
gift over of the residue, likewise gives a fee. Jones v. Bacon (1877) 68 Me. 34;
Henderson v. McCowan (1920, N. J. Eq.) iio Ati. 517. But a power of disposal,
however sweeping, will not enlarge an express life estate into a fee. Brant v. Va.
Coal & Iron Co. (1876) 93 U. S. 326; Stuart v. Walker (1881) 72 Me. 145;
contra, Bowen v. Bowen (1891) 87 Va. 438, 12 S. E. 885. When the gift is
indefinite, if the power can be construed as limiting the first taker's enjoyment to
his lifetime, he will be given a life estate only. Barry v. Austin (1919) 118 Me.
51, 105 Ati. 8o6; Mansfield v. Shelton (1896) 67 Conn. 390, 35 Atl. 271; Brook-
over v. Branyan (1916) 185 Ind. I, 112 N. E. 769. And when the words of the
gift to the first taker would naturally imply an absolute gift if standing alone, a
limitation over clearly showing that the testator believed that he had given merely
a life estate will cut down the first gift. Smith v. Bell (1832, U. S.) 6 Pet. 68;
Gruenewald v. Nen (1905) 215 Ill. 132, 74 N. E. 1Oi; Hopkins v. Keazer (1896)
89 Me. 347, 36 Atl. 615; contra, Mitchell v. Morse (1885) 77 Me. 423, I Atl. 141
(but not supported by authorities cited). It is clear that a bequest simpliciter is
not an absolute gift when the will as a whole shows a contrary intention. The
decision in the principal case should settle the Maine law beyond dispute. For a
general classification of bequests giving life estates, see (1921) 30 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 868.
WiLs-DECREE OF PROBATE COURT-CoNcLUSIVE THOUGH ENTERED UNDER A
MISTAKE OF LAw.-Upon the petition of an administratrix, a final decree of distri-
bution had been entered and the time for appeal had elapsed. Having obtained the
advice of new counsel, she sought to have the previous decree vacated on the
ground that it was entered under a mistake of law. A statute provided that the
court might relieve a party from a judgment taken against him through his
mistake. (Rem. Wash. Code, 1915, sec. 303.) Held, that the decree was conclu-
sive. it re Jones' Estate (1921, Wash.) 199 Pac. 734.
The ecclesiastical courts of England, which exercised exclusive jurisdiction over
the personalty of deceased persons, were not courts of record. Thus, unlike the
judgments of common-law courts, their decrees were not conclusive. Ward v.
Vickers (1802, N. C.) 2 Hayw. 164. Probate might be recalled for fraud or
collusion in propounding a will. See Hayle v. Hasted (1836) 1 Curt. Eccl. 236.
Also the conclusion of a cause could be rescinded to allow evidence of the testator's
signature to be introduced. Shaunessy v. Allen (1752) I Lee Eccl. 9. When,
however, jurisdiction over all wills was concentrated in a probate court, this became
a court of record. (1857) 20 & 21 Vict. c. 77. In the United States, probate
courts owe their existence and power to constitutions and statutes. Pelham v.
Murray (I8 .5) 64 Tex. 477, 481. They are usually courts of record. Farris v.
Burchard (1912) 242 Mo. I, 145 S. W. 825. At common law a final judgment of
a court of record, unless void, could not be set aside at a subsequent term. Spivey
v. Taylor (1920) 144 Ark. 301, 222 S. W. 57. Statutes, however, usually specify
certain grounds upon which a court may vacate a judgment of a previous term.
Miller zi Prout (1920) 32 Idaho, 728, 187 Pac. 948. Mistake is often included in
these grounds, as in the Washington statute. It is ordinarily construed to mean a
mistake of fact and not a mistake of law. Mann v. Hall (1913) 163 N. C. 5o,
79 S. E. 437; contra, Baxter v. Chute (1892) 50 Minn. 164, 52 N. W. 379. The
YALE LAW JOURNTAL
refusal to vacate the judgment in the instant case seems clearly sound, for, even in
the few states where judgments are set aside for mistakes of law, such relief
would not be granted to a party who petitioned for the very decree entered. See
Douglass v. Todd (1892) 96 Calif. 655, 659, 31 Pac. 623, 624.
WmLs-GFms CAUSA MoRmIs-To BE VALID AS DEED MUST PASS PRESENT
INTEREST.-A quitclaim deed from a wife to her husband for a nominal considera-
tion, made in anticipation of possible death from an operation, provided that it was
to be effective only if the grantee survived her, that it was "to vest and take effect!'
on her decease and until that time was to be subject to revocation on her part.
Held, that it was a testamentary document and invalid under the Statute of Wills.
Butler v. Sherwood (192i) 196 App. Div. 603, j88 N. Y. Supp. 242.
The border line between a will and a deed not to be fully operative until the death
of the grantor, is elusive. Ballantine, When are Deeds Testamentary (i92O) i8
MicH. L. REv. 470. A will passes no present interest and is subject to recall at
any time. Nichols v. Emery (895) 1O9 Calif. 323, 41 Pac. io89. But a deed,
operative at the death of the grantor, to be valid, must be delivered by the grantor
with an intent to transfer some present interest to the grantee. Turner v. Scott
(I866) 5i Pa. 126; Shaull v. Shaull (I918) 182 Iowa, 770, I66 N. W. 3oi;
Underhill, Wills (igoo) sec. 37. The grantor may convey a fee simple estate
expressly reserving to himself a life estate. Tennant v. John Tennant Memorial
Home (1914) 167 Calif. 570, 140 Pac.. 242; Hudspeth v. Grumke (1919, Mo.)
214 S. W. 865. Or the grantor may have clearly negatived any intent to pass a
present interest. Leaver v. Gauss (1883) 62 Iowa, 314, 17 N. W. 522. It is in
the absence of such express conditions that the courts have difficulty in determining
whether a present interest has passed. This is dependent upon the intention of the
parties to be ascertained by a close analysis of the language used or by the sur-
rounding circumstances. Hohenstreet v. Segelhorst (192o, Mo.) 227 S. W. 80;
Seay v. Huggins (1915) 194 Ala. 496, 70 So. 113; Sprunger v. Ensley
(1920) 211 Mich. 102, 178 N. W. 714., The majority of courts attempt to construe
the language as implying a life estate reserved to the grantor with the grantee's
fee arising by way of remainder, i.e. title vests in praesenti, though the enjoyment
is in futuro. Bullard v. Suedmeier (1920) 291 Ill. 400, 126 N. E. 117; Green v.
Skinner (1921, Calif.) i97 Pac. 60; see Abbott v. Holway (1881) 72 Me. 298.
The delivery must in every case be unequivocal. Where the deed is to be 
operative
on the happening of an uncertain contingency other than the death of the grantor,
the delivery is usually held ineffective even though the contingency occur. Stone
v. Daily (1919) 181 Calif. 571, 185 Pac. 664; Weber v. Brak (i919) 289 Ill.
564, 124 N. E. 654; see also Seeley v. Curts (1913) 18o Ala. 445, 61 So. 8o7.
The retaining of the power to control or recall the deed during the grantor's life-
time renders delivery conditional and hence ineffective. Worts v. Worts (1915)
128 Minn. 251, 15o N. W. 809; Eckert v. Stewart (I918, Tex. Civ. App.) 207
S. W. 317; contra, Lippold v. Lippold (igoo) 112 Iowa, 134. 83 N. W. 
809.
But every effort is made to validate the manifest intent of the parties. Jones v.
Caird (1913) 153 Wis. 384, 141 N. W. 228; Price v. Cross (I918) 148 Ga. 137,
96 S. E. 4. However, the combination of c6nditions of testamentary aspect such
as appears in the instant case, coupled with the power to recall the deed, clearly
renders the instrument void as an attempted will.
